

## I. A few general points:

- (1) With just a couple of exceptions, the exercises were about the LGB Binding Theory (BT), as summarized (and augmented) in Section D of the BT handout. I stated this at the very top of the HW page. [The exceptions are the questions that were explicitly about the earlier Chomsky 1973/1976 on Transformations framework, as summarized (and slightly revised) in Sections A and B. These are exercises (3) and (4)]. Thus, except for questions, you should be appealing to things like Cond. A, Cond. B, Governing Category (rather than SSC, TSC, etc.)
- (2) Crucially, the LGB BT does NOT demand that an anaphor be A-bound. Rather, it demands that an anaphor be A-bound in its governing category (GC). This is stronger than a requirement that an anaphor be A-bound, because it imposes locality. But it is also weaker, in that it is vacuously satisfied if there is no GC. [The latter is crucial in the “PRO Theorem”.]
- (3) Related to the previous remarks above, Condition A does NOT demand that an anaphor have a GC.
- (4) Look at
 

\*John<sub>i</sub> thinks himself<sub>i</sub> is a genius

It is true that ‘himself’ here is not A-bound in its GC. Is it true that ‘himself’ isn’t, or can’t be, A-bound? In fact, in this ex., ‘himself’ IS A-bound, as it is coindexed with and c-commanded by the NP ‘John’. <So why is the ex. bad? Because ‘himself’ here has a GC, and has no A-binder in that GC>
- (5) For Chomsky 1973/1976, we need to say that RI/DR doesn’t apply when the 2<sup>nd</sup> NP is any sort of anaphor. (Chomsky (1976) did, in fact limit DR to pronouns.) Otherwise, we rule out virtually all anaphors, as in “John injured himself”, “I injured myself”. A reflexive rule would connect the anaphor with its antecedent. Then, unless we offer the above stipulation, the anaphor would be forced to be disjoint with that antecedent. -In LGB, this becomes the fact that Cond. B is strictly about binding of **pronouns** (so not anaphors, except, of course, the pronominal anaphor PRO).
- (6) Chomsky 1973/1976 must have been assuming that trace and PRO can never be X in relations. Otherwise why the complicated mess about specified subjects vs. non-specified subjects? But he never articulated that assumed stipulation nor tried to justify it. Once we do eliminate that unstated stipulation it becomes possible to state that **all** subjects block relations across them. We no longer need the specified/non-specified distinction.
- (7) To make the binding conditions do any work, we must assume that all referring type expressions are indexed, a suggestion already made by Chomsky 1965.
- (8) In exercise (3), where we were exploring various conceivable versions of GC, for the one that dropped AGR as a SUBJECT, I also slightly expanded the role of subjects as SUBJECTs to include subjects of finite clauses. That is, I said “(simplifying to just subject of S or NP); thus, the limitation to non-finite S is removed. To the best of my

knowledge, LGB had the non-finite limitation just to avoid a sort of redundancy by which in many circumstances, both AGR and subject would be SUBJECTs.

- (9) A GC for an item  $\alpha$  must include a governor of  $\alpha$  **and** a SUBJECT **accessible to  $\alpha$** . Accessibility is crucial. (That is, the SUBJECT must m-command  $\alpha$  to be accessible to it.) Notice that the accessible SUBJECT and the governor need not be in the same XP.
- (10) ‘Coreference’ is a semantic notion; ‘coindexed’ is a (purely) syntactic one. Similarly for ‘disjoint reference’ and ‘constrained’. If the 2 members of each pair are to be connected, the theory has to explicate exactly how, with rules relating stating relations between aspects of structure and aspects of meaning. Such rules are often called ‘semantic rules’ or ‘semantic interpretive rules’. <See (88)-(99) of the HO, or, if you want the source of the argument, my 1981 paper ‘On two recent treatments of disjoint reference’.>
- (11) In LGB, the following are **not** principles or conditions:
  - PRO must not be governed
  - PRO must not have a GC.Rather, they are distributional generalizations that Chomsky claims follow from Cond’s A and B, plus the proposal that PRO is a pronominal anaphor. Importantly, distributional generalizations can’t explain anything. Rather, they are what need to be explained. <If this point isn’t clear, take another look at the BT HO (81)-(84).>  
Note that, crucially, once PRO is allowed to exist this way, both binding conditions A and B are rendered moot. By virtue of having no GC, PRO vacuously satisfies both conditions. But that entails that those conditions can’t force any particular indexing. Whatever index PRO has, both conditions are satisfied.

II. A few points about specific exercises, or multiple exercises:

- (12) In exercise (1) I requested “**and** at least some additional evidence ...” By this, I meant that I wanted some additional evidence.
- (13) For (1b), “They seem to each other to be intelligent”, it doesn’t suffice to observe that ‘each other’ wouldn’t be A-bound in DS. Why not? Because Cond. A doesn’t require that an anaphor be A-bound. Rather it requires that it be A-bound **in its GC**. So to use the ex. to argue against DS application of Cond. A, it is necessary to show that ‘each other’ has a GC in DS.
- (14) In exercise (2), about making c-command reflexive, many of you said things like then an NP can c-command itself, or might c-command itself. Here’s a nit-picky point: Those are both too weak. If c-command is reflexive, then every NP DOES c-command itself.
- (15) In exercise (3), for both  $\rightarrow$  parts, I asked “What still works and what goes wrong ...” By this, I meant “What still works and what goes wrong ...”
- (16) In almost every exercise, I asked for specific examples. What I meant by this was that I wanted specific examples (rather than just generalities).

- (17) For (5c), about the explanation for the complementarity of A-trace and lexical anaphors, both the Case Filter and the Theta Criterion are potentially relevant.
- (18) For exercise (6), I said “**show relevant portions of the structures with trees or labeled bracketings.**” By this, I meant “**show relevant portions of the structures with trees or labeled bracketings.**” Life lesson: If someone who has some authority over you tells you to do something in **bold underlined**, it’s probably a good idea to do it. Similarly for “***When Governing Category is relevant, say exactly what the GC is, and how you determined it.***”, which I put in bold italics. What I meant by that is “***When Governing Category is relevant, say exactly what the GC is, and how you determined it.***”
- (19) The following would be a perfectly good HW exercise:  
Explain the ungrammaticality of  
\*Mary<sub>1</sub> believes her<sub>1</sub> to be clever  
Don’t look now. Did I ask that question? Okay now look. I **didn’t** ask that question. Interestingly **virtually all** of you answered that question. And you are in abundant good company. Every year, **virtually everyone** answers that question, even though I never ask it. What I ask for is an explanation of the ungrammaticality of  
\*Mary believes her to be clever [with Mary and her coreferential]  
Think hard about the difference between the question I asked and the one you all answered. (If you can’t then see what I’m getting at, look again at the BT handout (88)-(91), and what follows. For still more discussion, you can look at my 1981 paper, linked on the course site.) <See (10) above.>